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COMMENT
POTENTIAL LIABILITY UNDER THE
ILLINOIS ELECTRONIC

COMMERCE SECURITY ACT: IS
IT A RISK WORTH TAKING?
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is true, that a written signature in script, maybe a safer mode of subscribing one's name, but where a party has adopted a signature made in
any other mode, and had issued an instrument with such adopted signature, for value, he is estopped from denying its validity.
Illinois Supreme Court (1864)1
The era of documenting transactions with the handwritten signature has changed forever. A new technology has arisen that will allow
users to make binding agreements over the Internet. With this new
technology, participants now have the ability to become more active in
commerce and, thus, create a faster and more efficient market.2 This
1. Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 432 (1864) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Hillstrom v.
Gosnay, 614 P.2d 466 (1989); Franklin v. County Coop. v. MFC Services, 441 So. 2d 1376
(Miss. 1983); Hideca Petroleum Corp. v. Tampimac Oil Intl Ltd., 740 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987); Watson v. Tom Growney Equip. Inc., 721 P.2d 1302 (N.M. 1986); Matter of
Save On Carpet of Arizona, Inc., 545 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1976). Modem cases have expanded their holdings to account for modem technology. For example, in U.S. v. Miller, 70
F.3d 1353, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the court held that unauthorized use of a PIN number to
withdraw funds from an ATM machine was forgery because such un-uthorized use of the
PIN number was "tantamount to cashing a check with a forged signature." Also, in Spevak,
Cameron & Boyd v. Nat'l Community Bank of New Jersey, 677 A.2d 1168 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1996), the court held that the use of an account number as an endorsement on a
check constituted a signature. Thus, according to the court, "in this computer age the use
of numbers as a means of identification has become pervasive. Indeed, numbers are more
readily recognized and handled than signatures." Id.
2. By fully implementing digital signatures into commerce, there are both costs and
benefits. The costs consist of:
Institutional overhead: The cost of establishing and utilizing certification authorities, repositories, and other important services, as well as assuring quality in the
performance of their functions. Subscriber and Relying Party Costs: A digital
signer will require software, and will probably have to pay a certification authority
some price to issue a certificate. Hardware to secure the subscriber's private key
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new technology is called digital signature, and its application is infinite.
The digital signature process, if implemented in the right manner,
can replace present notarial procedures. In using present notarial procedures, a signer must appear before the notary and sign his or her signature in the physical presence of the notary. However, if a signer were to
choose a digital signature as the security procedure, the signer could
electronically transmit the information to a certification authority who
would then electronically certify the electronic document. The certification authority would then forward the electronic document to the recipient, thus, eliminating the need for the physical appearance of the signer,
unlike a notarization.
Digital signature technology also offers participants a higher level of
security than current notarial procedures, since forgery of a digital signature is significantly more difficult than forgery of a traditional handwritten signature. 3 Furthermore, digital signature technology allows an
electronic document to remain digital for its lifetime, 4 thereby decreasing the amount of paper and space needed to store the document. 5
may also be advisable. Persons relying on digital signatures will incur expenses
for verification software and perhaps for access to certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRL) in a repository.
DigitalSignature Guidelines, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. SCi. & TECH. 16 (citations omitted) [hereinafter DigitalSignature Guidelines]. The benefits consist of:
[T]he principal advantage to be gained is more reliable authentication of
messages. Digital signatures, if properly implemented and utilized, offer promising solutions to the problems of Impostors, by minimizing the risk of dealing with
impostors or persons who have attempted to escape responsibility by claiming to
have been impersonated; Message integrity, by minimizing the risk of undetected
message tampering and forgery, and of false claims that a message was altered
after it was sent; Formal legal requirements, by strengthening the view that legal
requirements of form, such as writing, signature, and an original document, are
satisfied, since digital signatures are functionally on a par with, or superior to
paper forms; and Open systems, by retaining a high degree of information security, even for information sent over open, insecure, but inexpensive and widely used
channels.
Id.
3. See Digital Signatures: Signing on the Digital Line (visited Sept. 4, 1998) <http:fl
www.uwi.com>.
4. Id.
5. Id. However, long term paper storage seems safer than long-term computer based
storage because of the nature of paper. For example, in The Notary & EDI, a paper
presented before the work group on notarization and nonrepudiation of the A.B.A.'s Information Security Committee, author Charles N. Faerber discussed the nature of paper:
[Iln contrast to modem electronic mechanisms, paper appears to be a flimsy, crude
instrument for storing and transmitting information, but it has many advantages.
Many of you know, for example, that there has been much talk of replacing court
reporters with audio taping machines. This would certainly save a lot of money,
but at what price? Have you ever tried to find a pertinent piece of spoken testimony on a lengthy tape? It is much easier to flip through pages of a document. Did
you know that in time the tape will turn to the equivalent of peanut butter- but we
will still have the paper on transcript? Paper is much underrated. In a plane
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In response to digital signature technology, Illinois Attorney General Jim Ryan, in April 1996, established the Illinois Commission on
Electronic Commerce and Crime [hereinafter Commission].6 The Commission was charged with the task of drafting electronic and digital signature legislation for Illinois. 7 The Commission drafted legislation
entitled the "Electronic Commerce Security Act" [hereinafter Act].8 The
crash or an earthquake, for example, every electronic device, every computer disk
drive may be obliterated. But what usually survives undamaged? Paper.
Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Notaries Public-Lost In Cyberspace, or Key Business Professionalsof the Future?, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 703, 731 (1997).
6. See COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CRIME, FinalReport of the Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime, H.B. 3180, 3 (Ill. 1998) (visited June 16, 1998)
<http'//www.mbc.comllegis/cece-fin.html>. The Attorney General of Illinois, Jim Ryan, established the Commission on Electronic Commerce and Crime in April of 1996 in order to
analyze the issues surrounding electronic commerce in Illinois, and to develop legislation.
Id. The Act was introduced into the House of Representatives on February 11, 1998 as
House Bill 3180. Id. The Act was passed unanimously on March 30, 1998. Id. Next, the
Act was introduced in the Senate. After making minor technical amendments, the Senate
unanimously passed the Act on May 15, 1998. Id. The House unanimously concurred with
the amendments on May 20, 1988. Id. The Governor signed the Act on August 14, 1998,
and it becomes effective as of July 1, 1999. See Info. Tech. and Electronic Com. L. Dep't.,
McBride Baker & Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Digital SignaturesLegislation, 1 (visited Sept. 9, 1998) <http'//www.mbc.com>.
7. See COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CRIME, supra note 6, at 4. The
legislation that the Commission was in charge of developing was geared toward the protection and promotion of the interests of Illinois businesses and citizens engaged in "online
business, commercial, and personal activities." Id. The Commission tried to create laws
that would:
1) remove existing legal barriers to electronic commerce,
2) ensure the legal authenticity and integrity of electronic documents during both
communication and subsequent storage,
3) facilitate the creation of enforceable electronic contracts,
4) minimize the incidence of electronic forgeries and deceptive online practices and
otherwise deter fraudulent and criminal activity online,
5) establish and promote a system for the reliable authentication and validation of
electronic documents, and
6) facilitate the electronic creation, storage, and preservation of a variety of business records as well as state and public records, such as deeds, UCC financing
statements, and court filings.
Id.
8. COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CRIME, supra note 6, at 5. The Illinois
Electronic Securities Act prepared by the Commission creates:
[A] technology and industry- neutral legal infrastructure necessary to implement
secure electronic commerce and record keeping practices for business and government agencies in Illinois. The Act accomplishes four unprecedented, substantive
objectives related to online commerce. First, it defines electronic writings
(records) and electronic signatures and establishes their legal legitimacy. Second,
it creates a new category of "secure electronic records" and "secure electronic signatures" to establish the trust necessary to facilitate and promote electronic commerce. Third, it specifies the legal rules relating to a special type of electronic
signature known as digital signature. Fourth, it authorizes all state agencies to
conduct their business electronically.
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Act was signed by the Governor on August 14, 1998, and goes into effect
on July 1, 1999. 9 The Act is generally applicable to all communications, 10 but specifically addresses electronic signatures," secure elecId. The Act will "advance public and private sector commerce by providing a strong, but
flexible, statutory infrastructure for all kinds of electronic exchanges without privileging a
particular industry, business type, or technology." Id. The Act is divided into four parts:
1) Part I of the Act (Article 5) addresses electronic records and electronic signatures generally. It basically provides that they should be treated in much the
same manner as paper records and paper signatures for purposes of complying
with statutory writing and signature requirements, evidentiary requirements, and
record keeping requirements. The purpose of this part of the Act is primarily to
remove any existing barriers to electronic commerce that may exist.
2) Part II of the Act (Article 10) deals with the question of trust. It defines a subset
of electronic records known as secure electronic records, and a subset of electronic
signatures known as secure electronic signatures. Secure electronic record and
secure electronic signatures define categories of records and signatures that are
accorded heightened evidentiary presumptions because of their enhanced reliability and trustworthiness, just as notarized documents are accorded heightened evidentiary presumptions for the same reason. The concept of a secure electronic
record and a secure electronic signature is critical to enabling electronic commerce. Businesses will be much more willing to enter into commercial transactions, extend credit, commit resources, ship goods, or otherwise rely on messages
from contracting parties transmitted over public networks such as the Internet
when they can be assured that such records and signatures will be accorded the
heightened evidentiary presumptions necessary to effectively make their transactions nonrepudiable.
3) Part III of the Act (Articles 15 and 20) addresses digital signatures, a form of
electronic signature, and specifies when a digital signature qualifies as a secure
electronic record and a secure electronic signature, and defines the basic rules governing the creation and use of certificates and digital signatures, and the obligations of the respective parties involved. This includes the allocation of risk and
liability between the certification authority, the subscriber, and any relying parties, and a determination of when it is appropriate to give rebuttable presumption
of validity to a digitally signed message.
4) Finally, Part IV of the Act (Article 25) addresses the acceptance and use of electronic records and electronic signatures by state and other governmental agencies.
Id. at 8.
9. See Info. Tech. and Electronic Com. L. Dep't., supra note 6, at 1.
10. See id.
11. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3 180, § 5-105 (effective July 1,
1999) <http//www.mbc.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>. Electronic signature as defined by the Act
is "a signature in electronic form attached to or logically associated with an electronic record." Id. On a paper document it is assumed that a signature is "attached" or "located"
somewhere on the paper that the signer intends to have validated. Id. at cmt. Furthermore, "since electronic records can be communicated separate from any tangible media on
which they exist" the definition of electronic signature requires that the signature be "'attached to or logically associated with'" the electronic record being signed. Id. at cmt. The
theory of attachment is similar to the approach taken by the Food and Drug Administration in its attempt to regulate electronic signatures as set forth at 21 C.F.R. section 11
(1997). Id. at cmt. In section 11.70 of the Food and Drug Administration regulations, it
requires that the electronic signatures be "linked to their respective electronic records to
ensure that the signatures cannot be excised, copied, or otherwise transferred to falsify an
electronic record by ordinary means . . . ." Id. at cmt. (citation omitted). However, an
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12
tronic signatures, and digital signatures.

electronic signature as defined by the Act requires a linking, it does not require that the
signature cannot be "excised, copied, or otherwise transferred." Id. at cmt.
12. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-110. A secure electronic signature is accomplished if:
A) Through the use of a qualified security procedure, it can be verified that an
electronic signature is the signature of a specific person, then such electronic signature shall be considered to be a secure electronic signature at the time of verification. If the relying party establishes that the qualified security procedure was:
1) commercially reasonable under the circumstances,
2) applied by the relying party in a trustworthy manner, and
3) reasonably and in good faith relied upon by the relying party.
B) A qualified security procedure for purposes of this Section is a procedure for
identifying a person that is:
1) previously agreed to by the parties, or 2) certified by the Secretary of
State in accordance with Section 10-135 as being capable of creating, in a
trustworthy manner, an electronic signature that:
a) is unique to the signer within the context in which it is used;
b) can be used to objectively identify the person signing the electronic
record;
c) was reliably created by such identified person, (e.g., because some
aspect of the procedure involves the use of a signature device or other
means or method that is under the sole control of such person), and
that cannot be readily duplicated or compromised; and
d) is created, and is linked to the electronic record to which it relates,
in a manner such that if the record or the signature is intentionally
or unintentionally changed after signing the electronic signature is
invalidated.
Id.
13. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 5-105. The definition of a digital
signature under the Act is:
[A] type of an electronic signature created by transforming an electronic record
using a message digest function, and encrypting the resulting transformation with
an asymmetric cryptosystem using the signer's private key such that any person
having the initial untransformed electronic record, the encrypted transformation,
and the signer's corresponding public key can accurately determine whether the
transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer's
public key; and whether the initial electronic record has been altered since the
transaction was made.
Id. "In certain cases, as specified in sections 10-105 and 10-110, and 15-101, and 15-105, [of
the Act] a digital signature may also qualify as a secure electronic signature, and a digitally signed electronic record may qualify as a secure record." Id. at cmt. 2. When a person
digitally signs an electronic record, the computer program executes the following functions:
1) using the electronic record as the input data, the software executes a message
digest function to translate the electronic record into a sequence of bits, referred to
a message digest, which is, in effect, a number that is unique to the message, and
is sometimes referred to as a "digital fingerprint" of the message;
2) using the message digest and the signer's private key as the input data, the
software then executes a public key encryption algorithm that encrypts the
message digest using the signer's private key to create the digital signature; and
3) the digital signature is then appended to the electronic record otherwise communicated or provided to the relying party.
Id. at cmt. 3. It is also important to know that a digital signature has no relationship to a
person's handwritten signature. Id. at cmt. 4. "When printed, a digital signature is not
normally readable, as it looks much like the following:"
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Through the implementation of the Act, Illinois has assumed a national leadership role in this new area of law. 14 The Act will help promote "private and public sector commerce by providing a strong, but
flexible, statutory infrastructure for all kinds of electronic exchanges
without privileging a particular industry. 15 However, new legislation
and new technology generally brings new legal problems, and such is the
case with the Act.
This Comment argues that the potential liability of digital signatures under the Act is too great and, therefore, is not an effective mode of
communication. Part II of this Comment explains the purpose, the significance, and the traditional role of the handwritten signature. Fur16
thermore, Part II establishes the basics of the digital signature process
as it relates to each participant. The participants in a digital signature
process consist of a subscriber, 17 a recipient,' 8 and a certification authorBEGIN SIGNATURE
owHtWXlsUlUI-P=91G=22ysbHhDHcBeZaVmq7L9AuNJ2Uuh2soUSpaufVsftu8tby
IkUXTGsGhAgsE
END SIGNATURE
Id. at cmt. 4. Also, a digital signature, unlike a handwritten signature, will be different
each time it is created. Id.
14. See COM2ca1SSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CRIME, supra note 6, at 5.
15. See id.
16. Sde Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 742. The digital signature process consists
of a subscriber, a recipient, and the certification authority. Id. A certification authority
issues the keys that will verify the digital signatures. Id. The subscriber can then send its
electronic documents securely through the use of the issued private key. Id. The recipient
will then receive the electronic documents and, with the use of its public key, it can access
the message. Id.
17. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 5-105 (effective July 1,
1999) <http://www.mbc.comllegis/cecc-fin.html>. A subscriber under the Act is: "[A] person
who is the subject named or otherwise identified in a certificate, who controls a private key
that corresponds to the public key listed in the certificate, and who is the person to whom
digitally signed messages verified by reference to such certificate are to be attributed." Id.
"The concept of a 'subscriber' is tied to the certificate." Id. at cmt. 2. Thus:
[T]he subscriber refers to a person named or otherwise identified in a certificate
(sometimes the subscriber is referred to as the "subject" of a certificate). Thus, a
person who digitally signs an electronic record, but who has not been issued a
certificate, is not a subscriber, even though such a person is using a digital
signature.
Id. at cmt. 2.
18. See DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 2, § 1.27. A recipient/relying party is
defined as: "A person who has received a certificate and a digital signature verifiable with
reference to a public key listed in the certificate, and is in a position to rely on them." Id. A
relying party can mean a person "actually or potentially relying upon a particular certificate and/or a digital signature verifiable with reference to a public key listed in the certificate. Id. § 1.27.1. Thus:
[T]he relying party relies upon the certificate to bind the public key to the identity
of the subscriber. Therefore, if the digital signature is verified, reliance upon the
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ity. 19 Part III of this Comment analyzes and argues why the use of digital signatures, under the Act, is too great of a liability for the
participants to be considered an effective mode of communication. Next,
Part III argues why potential digital signature participants, because of
the overwhelming liability imposed by the Act, must continue to use the
notarization process until the Act is properly amended. Finally, Part III
proposes amendments to the Act as well as suggests defensive tactics for
the subscriber. Part IV of this Comment concludes with the assertion
that the Act creates too great of a liability for digital signature participants, and that digital signatures must not be used as a mode of creating
binding agreements until the Act is properly amended.
II.

BACKGROUND

A person may be bound by any mark or designation he thinks proper to
adopt, provided it be used as a substitute for his name.
New York Court of Appeals (1844)20
A.

THE

HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE

A signature is not a part of the substance of a transaction, but is
instead a representation. 2 1 The handwritten signature traditionally
serves four purposes. 22 First, the signature acts as evidence. 23 A signature makes a writing authentic by identifying the signer to the signed
certificate is anticipated to lead to reliance upon the digital signature as the digital
signature of the subscriber identified in the certificate.
Id. § 1.27.2 (citation omitted).
19. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 5-105. A certification authority
under the Act is defined as: "[A] person who authorizes and causes the issuance of a certificate." Id. A certification authority performs two functions:
1) It is responsible for identifying and authenticating the intended subscriber to be
named in the certificate, and verifying that such subscriber possesses the private
key that corresponds to the public key that will be listed in the certificate.
2) The certification authority is responsible for creating (i.e., manufacturing) and
digitally signing the certificate. The certificate issued by the certification authority then represents that certification authority's statement as to the identity of the
person named in the certificate and the binding of that person to a particular public-private key.
Id. at cmt. 2.
20. Brown v. Butchers & Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill 443, 444 (N.Y. 1844); see also Joseph
Denuzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128 n.16 (S.D. Cal. 1948), afld, 188 F.2d 569
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951) (stating that a signature is whatever symbol,
mark, or device one chooses to use as a representative of himself).
21. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 3.
22. See id. at 4; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 (1981). The Restatement notes that signed writings serve as a "deterrent" which seeks to "discourage
transactions of doubtful utility." Id.
23. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 4.
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document. 24 Thus, when the signer makes a mark in a distinctive manner the writing becomes attributable to the signer. 25 Second, the signature acts as a ceremonial device. 2 6 By signing the document, the signer
becomes aware of the legal significance of the signer's act 2 7 and, thereby,
helps prevent inconsiderate engagements. 28 Third, the signature is a
sign of approval. 29 Law and custom has defined a signature as an expression of the signer's approval of the writing or the intent that the
document have a legal effect. 30 Finally, the signature is an efficient
tool.3 1 Thus, a signature on a document performs the function of bringing finality to the transaction and lessens the subsequent need to inquire
32
beyond the face of a document.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4 & n.4. Note 4 explains that the writing is attributable to the signer under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, statutory note preceding § 110 (1982) ("summarizing purpose of the statute of frauds, which includes a signature requirement"). Id. Note 4
also discusses, 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 508-85 (Bowring ed.
1962) (1839), in that "Bentham called forms serving evidentiary functions 'preappointed
[i.e., made in advance] evidence.'" Id. "A handwritten signature creates probative evidence
in part because of the chemical properties of ink that make it adhere to paper, and because
handwriting style is quite unique to the signer." Joseph M. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds
in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions of Form, 43 FoRDHAM L. REV. 39, 64-69
(1974); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (stating that "'[sligned' includes any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing"). Id. at n4.
26. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 4 & n.5. Note 5 references "inconsiderate engagements" to 2 JOHN AUSTIN,
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 939-44 (4th ed. 1873).
29. See id. at 4.
30. See id. at 4 & n.6. Note 6 expands the approval theory by stating that under the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce, United Nations Commission On International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), 29th Sess., art. 7(1), at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 9/XXX IX/ CRP.1/add.13
(1996), "[wlhere a law requires a signature of a person, that requirement is met in relation
to a data message if: (a) a method is used to identify that person and to indicate that person's approval of the information contained in the data message." Id. at n.6. Note 6 also
discusses the Draft Model Law on Legal Aspects of Electronic Data Interchange and Related Means of Data Communication, United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL), 28th Sess., art. 6, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.91406 (1994). For example,
the signature on a contract customarily indicates the signer's assent. Id. at n.6. Comparatively, the signature on the back of a check is customarily taken as an endorsement. See
U.C.C. § 3-204 (1990).
31. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 4.
32. See id. at 4 & n.7. Note 7 discusses the comparison of a "form of a legal transaction
to the minting of coin, which serves to make their metal content and weight apparent without further examination." Id. at n.7. Thus:
The notion of clarity and finality provided by a form are largely predicated on the
fact that the form provides good evidence. The basic premise of the efficiency and
logistical function is that a signed, written document is such a good indicator of
what the transaction is, that the transaction should be considered to be as the
signed document says. The moment of signing the document thus becomes

decisive.
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The requirements for legal transactions have varied throughout
time. Consequently, there has been a variance in the legal consequences
of failure to cast the transaction in a required form. 33 Today, legal systems have begun to lower formal standards, or at least have minimized
the consequences of failure to satisfy those standards. 3 4 Nevertheless,
sound practice still calls for transactions to be formalized in a manner
that assures validity and enforceability. 3 5 Thus, in today's practice, formalization normally involves documenting the transaction on paper and
signing the paper to confirm the transaction. 36 However, this traditional
37
method is beginning to undergo a fundamental change.
The fundamental change 38 is driven by technology. Now, computers
read and send information stored as bits, "rather than atoms of ink and
paper," 39 near the speed of light. The information may also be duplicated without limit and at a low cost.40 Consequently, the law is slowly
changing to adapt to this new technology.
However, new laws that regulate new technology may contain unforeseen inefficiencies, which must be corrected to better serve the new
technology. Similarly, the Act possesses inefficiencies and it too must be
amended to better serve the new technology.
B.

THE DIGITAL SIGNATURE PROCESS

In order to understand the legal liability of each participant in the
41
digital signature process, one must first understand the process itself.
An individual has a right to adopt almost any mark as his or her identification symbol. 4 2 Therefore, a digital signature, when used to endorse an
Id.
33. See id. at 5.
34. Id. at 5 & n.10. Note 10 refers to Perillo, supra note 25, and discusses how, in
"Anglo-American law, there are many examples of the trend away from formal requirements." Id. at n.10. "For example, the common law seal has little remaining significance."
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, statutory note preceding § 95 (1982).
35. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 5 & n.ll (stating that notarizing
documents is also sound practice for ensuring validity).
36. See id. at 5.
37. Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that providing change
through technology is a given).
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 6.
40. See id.
41. See supra note 16 (dealing with the digital signature process).
42. See Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117, 128 n.16 (S.D. Cal. 1948),
affid, 188 F.2d 569 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 820 (1951) (stating that a signature is
whatever symbol, mark, or device one chooses to use as a representative of himself); Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 993 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a signature need
not be in any particular form); U.C.C. § 1-201(39) (1992) (stating that "[sligned includes
any symbol executed or adopted by a party with the present intention to authenticate a
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electronic document, is the "functional equivalent or computer generated
43
manifestation of a manual signature."
1.

The Subscriber/Signer

Using cryptography, 44 a subscriber affixes a digital signature to the
electronic document through the use of electronic keys. 4 5 Two types of
electronic keys are involved in the process. 46 The subscriber possesses
the first key called the private key.4 7 The document signer creates the
private key.48 The signer uses the private key to place his or her signature onto the document. 4 9 The signature itself is "actually a 'hash'- a
string of digits (letters, numbers, and/or symbols) representing a combination of the document and the unique computer-generated code produced by the document's signer."50 In processing the signature, the
document's signer types "in a pass [- phrase (much like a PIN number
for a bank teller machine), and then [the] private key generates a long
string of numbers and letters which represents the 'signature."' 5 1 Consequently, since each computer-generated signature is unique to each
52
document, each private key produces a different sequence of numbers
writing"); see also Marks Aren't X-traordinary,NAT'L NOTARY MAG., Mar. 1997, at 22 (stating that "[bly custom and law, a witness' mark is the same as a regular signature and may
be notarized").
43. Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 735.
44. See Michael D. Wims, Law and the Electronic Highway, Are Computer Signatures
Legal?, 10 CRIM. JUST. 31 (1995). "Encryption" is a technique used to convert a message
into a secret form. Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues in Cryptography, 13 COMPUTER L.J. 1
(1996). Encryption is a term that relates to many different fields, including digital signatures, decryption, key certification, and authentication. Id
45. Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 735; see also Digital Signature Guidelines,
supra note 2, at 8. Digital signatures use "public key cryptography." Id. This system "employs an algorithm using two different but mathematically related' keys,' one for creating a
digital signature or transforming data into a seemingly unintelligible form, and another
key for verifying a digital signature or returning the message to its original form." Id.
46. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 735.
47. See id.; see also DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 8. "The complementary keys of an asymmetric cryptosystem for digital signatures are arbitrarily termed the
private key, which is known only to the signer and used to create the digital signature, and
the public key." Id.
48. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 735.
49. See id.
50. See id.;
see also DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 9. "The hash function is an algorithm which creates a digital representation or 'fingerprint' in the form of a
'hash value' or 'hash result' of a standard length which is usually much smaller than the
message but nevertheless substantially unique to it." Id.; see also WARWICK FORD, COMPUTER COMMUNICATION SECURITY: PRINCIPLES, STANDARD PROTOCOL & TECHNIQUES 75-84
(1994).
51. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 736.
52. See id.
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and, therefore, a new signature is created for each document.
2.

The Recipient/Relying Party

On the other end of the electronic transmission is the document's
recipient. 5 3 The recipient holds the second key, which is known as the
public key5 4 by which he or she can decrypt the sender's document and
signature through the use of a computer program. 5 5 The computer program matches the private key of the signer with the public key of the
recipient to ensure that neither the document nor the signature has been
altered prior to or during transmission. 5 6 This process is referred to as
public key cryptography. 57 Therefore, "if a private key other than the
one identified with the subscriber.. . [is] used to encrypt the document,
or if the document [is] changed in any way between execution and verification, the hashes [will] differ from each other and the signature [will]
58
fail verification."
3.

The CertificationAuthority

The responsibility of deciding whether the digital signature is authentic is the responsibility of an independent third party called the certification authority. 5 9 For example, during an electronic transmission,
the sender encodes a signature on the computer using the private key,
53. See id.
54. Id.; see also DigitalSignature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 8. The public key is used
by the relying party "to verify the digital signature." Id. However:
If many people need to verify the signer's digital signatures, the public key must
be available or distributed to all of them, perhaps by publication in an on-line
repository or directory where it is easily accessible. Although the keys of the pair
are mathematically related, if the asymmetric cryptosystem has been designed
and implemented securely it is "computationally infeasible" to derive the private
key from knowledge of the public key. Thus, although many people may know the
public key of a given signer and use it to verify that signer's signatures, they cannot discover that that signer's private key and use it to forge digital signatures.
This is sometimes referred to as the principal of "irreversibility."
Id. at 8-9. "Computationally infeasible" is defined as a "[cloncept based on the value of the
data protected, the computing overhead required to protect it, the length of time it needs to
be protected, and the cost and time required to attack the data, with such factors assessed
both currently and in the light of future technological advance." Id. at n.23.
55. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 736.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id.; see also John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Davids, Bartleby the Cybertographer,
Legal Profession Preparesfor Digital Signatures, 215 N.Y. L. J. S4 (1996).
59. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737 & n.205. "It is important to keep in
mind that while most of the functions performed by certification authorities resemble those
of notaries public, a certification authority does not need to be commissioned notary public
to verify the authenticity of digital signatures." Id. at n.205.
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and clicks on the sign document button.6 0 By clicking on the sign document button, the digital signature is sent to a repository 6 1 that stores the
coded signature. 62 The repository is the central storage area that warehouses electronic documents such as certification certificates of
cybernotaries, lists of subscribers, and other information. 63 The certification authority then contacts the computer's repository to see if the private key as sent corresponds to the public key of the intended recipient
on file in the repository.6 4 If there is a match, the certification authority
digitally signs the document and issues a computer-based certificate of
authenticity, similar to the way that a notary would sign and seal a document to signify the validity of an original execution to a signature on
65
paper.
III.

ANALYSIS

People are the common denominator of progress. So... no improvement
is possible with unimproved people, and advance is certain when people
are liberated and educated.
John Kenneth Galbraith (1958)66
This Comment analyzes and argues why the use of digital signatures, under the Act, creates too great of a liability for digital signature
participants and, therefore, is not an effective mode of communication.
Next, this Comment argues that digital signature participants, because
of the overwhelming liability imposed by the Act, must continue to use
60. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737. See also David P. Vandagriff, Who's
Been Reading Your E-mail? Two Easy-to-Use Tools Can ProtectPrivacy, Integrity of Documents, 81 A.B.A. J. 98 (1995).
61. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737; see also Digital SignatureGuidelines,
supra note 2, § 1.28. The definition of repository is "[a] trustworthy system for storing and
retrieving certificates or other information relevant to certificates." Id. Also:
The basic contents of a repository generally consist of certificates which have been
published in that repository. A repository may also contain certification practice
statements, as well as further information about certification authorities (particularly those certification authorities who publish information in the repository), notices of suspension or revocation, subscribers, information processing and
electronic commerce standards, and similar materials.
Id. § 1.28. 1. Furthermore, "a repository will make its information available on-line." Id.
§ 1.28.2. Thus:
[A] repository's information may be made available to a broad, generally defined
group of users or to a limited group, and its availability may be subject to conditions such as payment of fees, reasonable and regular hours of operation, security
measures such as identification of persons or systems having access, etc.
Id.
62. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. JOHN BARLErr, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 358 (15th ed. 1980).
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the notarization process until the Act is properly amended. Finally, this
Comment proposes amendments to the Act as well as suggests defensive
tactics for the subscriber.
A.

THE

LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE SUBSCRIBER-A CERTAIN DEATH

When a subscriber is ready to send an electronic document using
digital signature technology, 67 as governed under the Act, he or she simply clicks on the signature button 68 located on the computer screen and
the digital signature process begins. 6 9 However, if the subscriber under67. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 5-105 cmt. 2 (effective
July 1, 1999) <http://www.mbc.comllegis/cecc-fin.html>. Digital signature technology involves an asymmetric algorithm which uses two mathematically related keys for encrypting and decrypting information. Id
[T]he keys that compromise a key pair are simply numbers-typically very large
prime numbers. The algorithm is designed so that one key pair is used for signing
(i.e. encryption) and the other key is used for signature verification (i.e., decryption). Each pair possesses a variety of fundamental characteristics including the
following: one key can sign a message, but the other key must then be used to
verify the message; and knowledge of one key does not facilitate calculation of the
other corresponding key.
Id. A digital signature that is created using an asymmetric algorithm certified by the Secretary of State shall be considered to be a qualified security procedure for the purpose of
identifying a person if:
(1) the digital signature was created during the operational period of a valid certificate, was used within the scope of any other restrictions specified or incorporated
by reference in the certificate, if any, and can be verified by reference to the public
key listed in the certificate; and
(2) the certificate is considered trustworthy (i.e., an accurate binding of a public
key to a person's identity) because the certificate was issued by a certification authority in accordance with standards, procedures, and other requirements specified by the Secretary of State, or the trier of fact independently finds that the
certificate was issued in a trustworthy manner by a certification authority that
properly authenticated the subscriber and the subscriber's public key, or otherwise
finds that the material information set forth in the certificate is true.
Id. § 15-105.
68. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737. In a common electronic transaction,
the subscriber codes the signature on the computer using the private key. Id. The subscriber will then click on the "sign document" button. Id. By doing so, the digital signature
is sent to a repository. Id. The certification authority contacts the repository and verifies
whether the private key, as sent, matches the public key of the intended recipient. Id. If it
does, the certification authority digitally signs the document and issues a certificate of authenticity. Id.
69. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 5-105 cmt. 2. However, for policy
reasons, there are three categories of documents where electronic signatures should not be
applied:
(1) [when] application would involve a construction of a rule of law that is clearly
inconsistent with the intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of
the same rule of law;
(2) to any rule of law governing the creation or execution of a will or trust, living
will, or healthcare power of attorney;
(3) to any record that serves as a unique and transferable instrument of rights and
obligation including, without limitation, negotiable instruments and other instru-
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stood the liability of sending such a document, as entailed under the
Act, 70 the subscriber would not use the digital signature process. Instead, the subscriber must use the method of notarization 7 1 until the Act
is properly amended.
1.

The Liability Attached to the Signature Device

Under the Act, a subscriber and all other persons 7 2 who can digitally
sign a document must exercise reasonable care 73 in maintaining the se74
crecy of the private key. The private key acts as the signature device.
In maintaining the secrecy of the private key through the standard of
reasonable care, the subscriber will not only need to prevent unauthorized access, but the subscriber must prevent disclosure of the private key
during the period 7 5 in which a recipient would reasonably rely on a sigments of title wherein possession of the instrument is deemed to confer title, unless an electronic version of such record is created, stored, and transferred in a
manner that allows for the existence of only one unique, identifiable, and unalterable original with the functional attributes of an equivalent physical instrument,
that can be possessed by only one person, and which cannot be copied except in a
form that is readily identifiable as a copy.
Id. § 5-120(c); see also § 5-120 cmt. 5.
70. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-130. A subscriber is required to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature was neither his nor authorized
by him. Id. The subscriber has been issued the risk of loss since the electronic document
was sent with his signature attached, and if the relying party reasonably relies on the
message, the subscriber will be bound. Id.
71. See THE NAT'L NOTARY ASS'N, THE MODEL NOTARY ACT § 3-101 (1984). The purpose
of the Act is to: "(1) promote, serve, and protect the public interest; (2) to simplify, clarify,
and modernize the law governing notaries; and (3) to make uniform notarial laws among
states enacting it." Id. § 1-102(6-10).
72. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 5-105 (effective July 1,
1999) <httpJ/www.mbc.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>. Person(s) under the Act is defined as "an
individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited partnership, limited liability partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government,
governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial
entity." Id.

73. BARRON's LAw DICTIONARY 396 (3d ed. 1991). "Reasonable care" is defined as "'that
degree of care which under the circumstances would ordinarily or usually be exercised by
or might be reasonably expected from an ordinary prudent person.'" Id.
74. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 5-105. Signature device as defined
by the Act means "unique information, such as codes, algorithms, letters, numbers, private
keys, or personal identification numbers (PINs), or a uniquely configured physical device,
that is required, alone or in conjunction with other information or devices, in order to create an electronic signature attributable to a specific person" Id. The definition realizes
that a signature device which is needed for the creation of an electronic signature can be
two different things. Id. at cmt. First, it can be a physical device such as a smart card. Id.
at cmt. Second, the signature device can be information such as a PIN number or a private
key or a secret code. Id. at cmt.
75. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 5-105. As mentioned in this comment, "period" refers to the certification authority's issued certificate which is only good for
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76
nature created by the subscriber.
However, the subscriber's standard of care is so low that it hurts
rather than helps the subscriber because the subscriber, in attempting to
prevent unauthorized access to the private key, will only take a reasonable standard of care approach. Thus, the subscriber, because it knows
that the standard of care is only a reasonable one, will not be as careful

a certain period of time. The period of the certificate is operational as defined by the Act at
the:
[D]ate and the time the certificate is issued by the certification authority (or on a
later date and time certain if stated in the certificate) and ends on the date and
time it expires as noted in the certificate or is earlier revoked, but does not include
any period which a certificate is superseded.
Id. During this period, the certification authority is obligated to maintain records and publish any notice of revocation. Id. Furthermore, the certification authority is obligated to
exercise due care in protecting the private key from all other persons. Id. "Certificate," as
defined by the Act, is a record that at a minimum:
(a) identifies the certification authority issuing it; (b) names or otherwise identifies
its subscriber, or a device or electronic agent under the control of the subscriber;
(c) contains a public key that corresponds to a private key under the control of the
subscriber; (d) specifies its operational period; and (e) is digitally signed by the
certification authority issuing it.
Id.
76. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 15-320. A certification authority
must revoke a certificate based on the policies governing revocation as specified in the certification practice statement. Id. A "certification practice statement," as defined by the Act,
is "a statement published by a certification authority that specifies the policies or practices
that the certification authority employs in issuing, managing, suspending, and revoking
certificates and providing access to them." Id. § 5-105. However, in the absence of such a
policy or procedure, a certificate must be revoked as soon as possible after:
(1) receiving a request for revocation by the subscriber named in the certificate,
and confirming that the person requesting revocation is the subscriber, or is an
agent of the subscriber with authority to request the revocation;
(2) receiving a certified copy of an individual subscriber's death certificate, or upon
confirming by other reliable evidence that the subscriber is dead;
(3) being presented with documents effecting a dissolution of a corporate subscriber, or confirmation by other evidence that the subscriber has been dissolved or
has ceased to exist;
(4) being served with an order requiring revocation that was issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction; or
(5) confirming by the certification authority that;
a material prerequisite to issuance of the certificate was not satisfied,
the certification authority's private key or systems operations were compromised
in a manner materially affecting the certificate's reliability, or the subscriber's private key was compromised.
Id. Furthermore, the Act also states that, upon revocation, the certification authority
must:
[N]otify the subscriber and relying parties in accordance with the policies and procedures governing notice of revocation specified in its applicable certification practice statement, or in the absence of such policies and procedures, promptly notify
the subscriber, promptly publish notice of the revocation in all repositories where
the certification authority previously caused publication of the certificate, and
otherwise disclose the fact of revocation on inquiry by a relying party.
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in protecting the private key than if the standard of care were absolute.
Therefore, under the reasonable standard of care approach, potential liability is greater because of the risk of more unauthorized access and
more security breeches stemming from the low standard of care.
Moreover, if the standard were changed to absolute liability, the
subscriber would be more careful in protecting the private key because of
the liability that would be imposed on the subscriber. Therefore, an absolute liability standard will force the subscriber to take preventative
measures to protect the private key, thereby defeating the potential liability that a reasonable standard of care creates. Thus, the subscriber
will expose himself to less potential liability with an absolute standard of
care, as compared to a reasonable standard of care, which will expose the
subscriber to numerous chances of potential liability.
2. A Subscriber'sPrivate Key v. A Signature Device for Check Signing
The obligation of the subscriber to exercise reasonable care can be
compared to the duty of a person who must exercise reasonable care in
regard to devices used to sign a name to a check. 77 For example, an employer keeps a rubber signature stamp along with blank checks in an
unlocked desk drawer. An unauthorized person takes the checks and
forges the signature of the employer through the use of the rubber
stamp. The bank honors the checks in good faith. 78 Who is liable? In
Illinois, a person who fails to exercise reasonable care in retaining control of his or her signature device is held liable. 79 Thus, the employer
pays for his or her lack of security in guarding the signature device.8 0
77. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-125. Check signing cases are
governed by Section 3-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code which is codified in Illinois at
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-406. Section 32-406(a) provides that:
[A] person whose failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to an
alteration of an instrument or to the making of a forged signature on an instrument is precluded from asserting the alteration or the forgery against a person
who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes it for value for collection.
Id. at cmt. 3. Therefore, one must maintain safeguards so that the signature device is not
used for fraudulent use. Id. at cmt 3. A failure to do so, if the failure is the cause of the
forgery, will thus, preclude one from asserting the forgery against the drawee bank. Id. at
cmt 3. "The burden of proving failure to exercise ordinary care is on the person asserting
the preclusion." Id.
78. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-125 cmt. 3 (effective
July 1, 1999) <http://www.mbc-com/legis/cecc-fin.html>. This hypothetical is taken from
comment three under section 10-125 of the Act. Under the hypothetical, the drawee bank
may defend that the employer cannot assert forgery against the bank because of its own
negligence. Id. The drawee bank would contend that because the employer failed to exercise ordinary care to safeguard the signature device and the checks, its failure to do so
contributed to the forgery. Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
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Similarly, a subscriber under the Act is held to the same accountability regarding the safekeeping of the signature device. 8 ' A subscriber
is held liable for the subscriber's signature, whether or not it is authorized, if the subscriber failed to exercise reasonable care and the relying
party reasonably and in good faith relied on the signature. 8 2 Therefore,
because the standard of care was a reasonable one in the above illustration, the employer exposed himself to potential liability by leaving the
checks and signature device unprotected. Thus, the potential liability
was high. However, if the standard of absolute liability was used, the
employer would have locked up both the checks and the signature device
for fear of the potential liability that would stem from an unauthorized
use. Absolute liability, thus, creates less potential liability situations,
thereby reducing overall liability. Therefore, until the Act amends the
standard of care for a subscriber's signature device to absolute liability, a
subscriber will continue to expose himself to more chances of potential
liability.
3. Allocation of Risk
The above example is a classic scenario in American law.8 3 The allocation of risk is given to the party who can best control it.8 4 Thus, the
subscriber is held liable if the subscriber fails to exercise reasonable
care. A similar example of such liability occurs when a subscriber has
incurred charges through the unauthorized use of his or her password in
81. See id. at cmt. 1.
82. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-130. The Act states:
Except as provided by another applicable rule of law, a secure electronic signature
is attributable to the person to whom it correlates, whether or not authorized, if:
(1) the electronic signature resulted from acts of a person that obtained the signature device or other information necessary to create the signature from a source
under the control of the alleged signer, creating the appearance that it came from
that party;
(2) the access or use occurred under circumstances constituting a failure to exercise reasonable care by the alleged signer; and
(3) the relying party relied reasonably and in good faith to its detriment on the
apparent source of the electronic record.
Id. Under section (b) of section 10-130 it further notes that:
(b) The provisions of this Section (10-130) shall not apply to transactions intended
primarily for personal, family, or house hold use, or otherwise defined as consumer
transactions by applicable law, including but not limited to, credit card and automated teller machine transactions, except to the extent allowed by applicable consumer law.
Id.
83. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-130 cmt. 2. The system of law
in America has always asked the basic question of which of the "two largely innocent parties must bear the loss occasioned by the misconduct of a third person who cannot be located or who was not in position to make good the loss." Id.
84. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-130 cmt. 2 (effective
July 1, 1999) <http://www.mbc.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>.

926

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVII

an on-line service.8 5 The end result is the same. The subscriber is liable
6
to the on-line service provider for charges incurred.
Another example of a device, which can cause liability to a subscriber through unauthorized use, is when unauthorized calls are made
using a subscriber's equipment.8 7 The subscriber again is held liable regardless of who used the equipment.8 8 Therefore, unauthorized use
translates into liability for a subscriber who fails to exercise reasonable
care.8 9 However, in the above illustrations, if the subscriber would have
been held to the standard of absolute liability for the device, the subscriber would have secured the devise for fear of the potential liability.
Therefore, absolute liability can actually reduce potential liability,
rather than increase liability, as the standard of reasonable care will do.
4.

The Hardship of Dealing with Real-Time

When engaging in digital signature transactions, one is dealing with
real-time. 90 A recipient will immediately react to the transmission and
will possibly induce reliance with other parties based on the transmission. 9 1 Therefore, the Act gives the recipient rebuttable presumptions
with respect to secure records and signatures, thereby giving the recipient the confidence to participate in real-time transactions which can be
92
enforced in court.
However, if a subscriber claims that the signature is false, the subscriber must prove his or her claim. 9 3 A subscriber will have a difficult
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. (providing security to prevent such unauthorized use can be as easy as
downloading security based software).
89. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-130 cmt. 2 (effective
July 1, 1999) <http://www.mbe.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>. The rule in the Act at section 10130 is consistent with the U.C.C. section 3-406(c) (codified in Illinois at 810 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/3-406(c)) in that the holder of a signature device is required to exercise reasonable
care. Id.
90. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-120 cmt. 1 (defining "real-time"
as a computer expression that means that the actions that are taking place are immediate).
91. See id.
92. See id. For a digital signature to be effective, the relying party of an electronic
transmission must be in a position to know, at the time the message is received, whether
the relying party can rely on the message or not. Id. More importantly, a relying party
must be able to enforce the message in court. Id. Thus, the "existence of rebuttable presumptions with respect to secure records and secure signatures will provide such assurances to relying parties thereby enabling them to engage in real time commercial activities
with confidence." Id.
93. See id. at cmt. 5. The subscriber must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the signature was not his. Id. In making the presumption justified, the Act establishes that the subscriber, rather than the relying party, is in a better position to prove who
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time proving the claim, since a digital signature is made up of bits (Os
and is) that are, in all respects, identical. 94 For example, the sub95
scriber's signature may look like the following:
BEGIN SIGNATURE
owHtWXlsUlUUP=91G=-22ysbHhDHcBeZaVmq7L9AuNJ2UuhX2soU
SpaufVsftu8tbylkUXTGsGhAgsE
END SIGNATURE
Alternatively, a signature in a notarization may look like this:
Milton L Myers. At least in the notarization process, the handwritten
signature can be examined by an expert to determine whether or not the
signature belongs to the signer. When using a digital signature, there
are no personal identifiers associated with the digital signature. There
are only numbers and symbols, which cannot be traced to the specific
person who signed the electronic document. 96 All that can be traced is
the signature device that came from the computer of a registered subscriber. Thus, notarization, because of the identification standards, is
more reliable in regard to identifying whether the signer is actually who
he or she claims to be. The participant, therefore, must not use digital
signatures technology as regulated by the Act until either absolute liability is invoked for the subscriber or biometric technology 9 7 is used.

actually sent the message. Id. For example, a subscriber is in a better position than the
relying party in establishing that the private key was stolen or copied. Id. A relying party
will not be privy to such information and, thus, have no evidence other than the security
procedure used to "prove that the person to whom the signature correlates did, in fact, send
the message." Id. Nevertheless, even if under section 10-130, the subscriber to whom the
signature correlates can prove that he did not send the message, he may be liable for losses
caused to the relying party if the requirements of section 10-130 of the Act are met. Id.; see
also supra note 89 (describing the requirements of section 10-130).
94. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-120 cmt. 1. Paper-based transactions have many indicators that a relying party can use to determine whether the document and the signature is authentic. Id. For example, paper transactions can have
watermarks or other forms of identification on the paper to prove that the document
originated from the signer. Id. The document can also be delivered through a trusted third
party, such as the postal service. Id. Most importantly, the handwritten signature can be
examined by an expert to see if it derived from a particular signer. Id. However, these
elements which accompany paper transaction do not exist in electronic transactions. Id.
"All that can be communicated are bits (Os and is) that are in all respects identical, and
that are easily copied and modified." Id.
95. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 5-105 (effective July 1,
1999) <http'//www.mbe.com/legiscecc-fin.html>.
96. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-120 cmt. 1.
97. See infra note 143 (stating that instilling such a security feature can be costly).
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THE LEGAL LIABILITY OF THE RECIPIENT-DEATH IN THE WAITING

The Legal Liability of the Recipient

The general theme regarding liability is that the relying party is responsible for information and events that are under the relying party's
control. 98 The Act seeks to balance the risk of loss between the subscriber and the recipient of an electronic message on the basis of information, and the procedures that the recipient relies on to verify a
message. 9 9 Thus, the relying party has an immense amount of responsibility if the procedure goes awry. If a problem does arise, the relying
party, under the Act, has three burdens to prove. 10 0 These burdens consist of: (1) proving that the use of the security procedure was commercially reasonable under the circumstances;10 1 (2) proving that the
security procedure was implemented by the relying party in a trustwor98. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-105 cmt. 2. The relying party
has the burden of proof with respect to evidence or information that it has under its own
control. Id. at cmt. 1. Evidence and information that would be under its control consist of
whether the relying party reasonably and in good faith relied upon the electronic message.
Id. If the relying party had knowledge that the security procedure was not reliable, it
should be held accountable for that knowledge and, therefore, it should not have relied on
the security procedure. Id.
99. See id.
100. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-105. If, in its use of a qualified
security procedure, a relying party can verify that an electronic record has not been altered
from a specific point in time, then the electronic record can be considered to be secure from
that point, if the relying party can establish that the procedure was: "(1) commercially
reasonable under the circumstances, (2) applied by the relying party in a trustworthy manner, and (3) reasonably and in good faith relied upon by the relying party." Id. § 10-105(a).
A qualified security procedure under the Act is "a security procedure to detect changes in
the content of an electronic record." Id. The security procedure can be "(1) previously
agreed to by the parties, or (2) certified by the Secretary of State in accordance with Section
10-135 as being capable of providing reliable evidence that an electronic record has not
been altered." Id.; see also 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4A-201, 202; U.C.C. Article 4A
§§ 201, 202.
The first category allows parties to agree among themselves on a security procedure
"they believe to be appropriate for their purposes." Id. at cmt. 4. The second category is
directed to parties "that have not agreed on a security procedure prior to their communication." Id. The second category recognizes that security procedures are "sufficiently secure
such that they are entitled to the benefit of enhanced evidentiary presumptions even in the
absence of an agreement between the parties to the communication." Id. Therefore, the
Secretary of State reviews such technology and makes a determination as to "Whether such
technology is generally accepted as capable of adequately establishing the integrity of an
electronic record, and if so, to exercise its rule making authority pursuant to Section 10-135
to certify such technology as appropriate as a qualified security procedure." Id.
101. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-105(a)(1) (effective
July 1, 1999) <http'//www.mbe.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>. Commercial reasonableness, as
defined by the Act, is "a relative term that depends not only on the nature of the security
procedure itself, but its implementation in specific situations. It is determined by the court
in light of the purposes of the procedure and the commercial circumstances at the time the
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thy manner;10 2 and (3) proving that the security procedure was implemented and relied upon by the relying party reasonably and in good

faith. 103

procedure was used." Id. at cmt. 5(a). Factors relevant in determining commercial reasonableness include:
[T]he nature of the transaction, the sophistication of the parties, the volume of
similar transactions engaged in by either or both of the parties, the availability of
alternatives offered to but rejected by either of the parties, the cost of alternative
security procedures, and security procedures in general use for similar types of
transaction.
Id. The purpose of having commercial reasonableness allows "a court to take into consideration new developments in technology relating to the security procedure that may have an
adverse impact on the trustworthiness or viability of the security procedure." Id.
102. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-105(a)(2). "Trustworthy manner" as defined by the Act means:
through the use of computer hardware, software, and procedures that, in the context in which they are used, they
(a) can be shown to be reasonably resistant to penetration, compromise, and
misuse;
(b) provide a reasonable level of reliability and correct operation;
(c) are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions or serving their
intended purposes;
(d) comply with applicable agreements between parties, if any; [and]
(e) adhere to generally accepted security procedures.
Id. § 5-105. The term "trustworthy manner" is intended to be flexible. Id. It concentrates
"on the context at hand and focuses on what is 'reasonable' within that context. Consequently, specified computer hardware, software, and/or procedures may be considered
trustworthy and appropriate in one situation, but not in another." Id. at cmt. 1. The definition of "trustworthy manner" also concentrates on a variety of trustworthiness. Id. at cmt.
3. Examples of "trustworthy manner" include:
(1) security from intrusion and misuse;
(2) reliability and correct operation;
(3) suitability to performing intended functions or purposes;
(4) compliance with applicable agreements of the parties; and
(5) adherence to generally accepted security procedures.
Id. Being implemented in a trustworthy manner "is a recognition that no matter how good
the procedure is, if not implemented properly[,] it will not achieve the desired goal." Id.
§ 10-105 at cmt. 5(b). Digital signatures are generally considered "to be an appropriate
security procedure for purposes of achieving secure status, this goal is achieved only if the
software that creates and interprets the digital signature works properly and is accurate.
Id.
103. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-105(a)(3). In determining
whether the requirement of whether a relying party's reliance on the security procedure is
reasonable and in good faith is met, all of the surrounding circumstances must be examined. Id. at cmt. 5(c). Factors that are considered in determining whether the relying
party acted in good faith consist of:
[I]nformation that the relying party knew or should have known at the time of the
reliance that would suggest whether reliance was or was not reasonable; the value
or importance of the electronic record involved; any course of dealing between the
parties; any usage of trade; and whether an independent third party was involved
in the process.
Id. In focusing on time of verification, as discussed in section 10-105(a) of the Act, "the fact
that an electronic record is verified by a security procedure and qualified as a secure elec-
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With all of these burdens required by the Act, the burden does not
outweigh the benefit. Proving that the security procedure was commercially reasonable under the circumstances, adequately implemented, and
relied upon in good faith will cost time and money. These burdens are
too great of a risk for anyone simply seeking a binding agreement to undertake. A digital signature is nothing more than a security procedure
commenced over the Internet. Therefore, unless a recipient is willing to
take on the responsibility of being able to prove the above burdens, the
tronic record at a particular point in time does not necessarily establish its status as a
secure electronic record indefinitely into the future." Id. at cmt. 6. The time of verification
has a limitation which takes into account two situations:
[F]irst, although the status record as a secure electronic record may have been
established as of the time it was received, there is the possibility that an electronic
record may have been tampered with or altered sometime after it was received and
prior to the time that it is tendered to a court for the resolution of a dispute. By
reapplying the security procedure at the time of the dispute, such alteration will
be disclosed. Second, there also exists the possibility that a strong security procedure used at the time an electronic record was communicated may no longer be
considered a strong security procedure at the time the record becomes material to
a dispute (i.e., with the passage of time it may have become possible to "crack" the
security procedure, and thus alter the electronic record in a manner that cannot be
detected by the security procedure). In such a case, the court or other trier of fact
will need to make a determination as to the continued viability of a security procedure that it used- i.e., that evidence regarding the vulnerability of a security
procedure may be used to rebut the presumption accorded to its status as a secure
electronic record by Section 10-120. In the event that technology changes, and
new developments render unreliable a security procedure that was previously considered trustworthy, it is contemplated that the requirement of commercial reasonableness, the requirement of a trustworthy implementation, and the
requirement of good faith reliance will all operate to allow a court to conclude that
a previously accepted security procedure is no longer secure in a given set of
circumstances.
Id. Furthermore, the application of "time of verification" requirement:
[C]ontemplates that the proponent of an electronic record will retain the information, software, digital certificates, and/or other materials necessary to execute or
implement the appropriate security procedure so that it is available at such time
when it may be necessary to establish the integrity of the electronic record (e.g., in
court). If there is a possibility of degradation in the strength of the security procedure over time, such party may also have the burden of addressing this issue, such
as by retaining an independent third party to preserve the evidence or otherwise
protecting the electronic record through the use of a new more secure security
procedure.
Id. at cmt 7. However, one must also note that the effect of the "time of verification" requirement does not render "the initial verification of an electronic record through the application of a security procedure at the time that an electronic record is received." Id.
Verification is important to determine, "the reasonableness of reliance by the relying party
of the message, and thus, is important even if a message is subsequently altered or a security procedure subsequently becomes ineffective as a result of advances in technology." Id.
The reference to "specific point in time" in section 10-105(a) of the Act is not intended to
require calculation of a specific time, although that may be necessary in some cases. Id. at
cmt. 8. Instead, the point in time that will be necessary to know may be defined by reference to an event which will suffice for resolving the dispute. An example of such [an] event
can consist of record creation or signing. Id.
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risk is too great and, thus, potential participants must be hesitant to use
the digital signature process as regulated by the Act.
2.

Why Using a Digital Signature as Regulated by the Act is too Great
of a Risk for the Relying Party

A subscriber is only held to a reasonable standard of care.10 4 In a
normal transaction where reasonable care was taken, a subscriber can
defeat his or her liability. In order to understand the significance of such
an event, the checkbook analysis used above serves as a good illustration. 10 5 For example, an employer possessing a checkbook and a signature device will not be held liable where there is a showing that no
inadequacy of security precautions were taken.' 0 6 In one case, an employer was not found negligent during a series of burglaries in which
checks were removed from the back of the checkbook and the checks
were signed using the employer's rubber signature stamp. 10 7 The checkbook and the signature stamp were left in their regular place and appeared to be left untouched.10 8 The employer, upon receiving notice of a
bank statement, promptly notified the bank that a forgery had taken
place. 10 9 The court found no inference of negligence. 110
A relying party must realize that the standard of reasonable care
that a subscriber will use in protecting the signature device is not acceptable. Therefore, a recipient must not use digital signatures, as regulated
by the Act, until the standard of care is heightened to absolute liability
for the subscriber regarding the safekeeping functions of the subscriber's
private key."' Therefore, a relying party must continue to use the notarization process until the Act is properly amended, so that the relying
party can conduct business without worrying about the subscriber and
the whereabouts of its private key.
C.

CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY-A GOD LIKE STATURE

A certification authority mirrors the responsibility of a notary 1 12 in
104. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-125(2).
105. See supra note 80.
106. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 10-125 cmt. 3.
107. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-125 (effective July
1, 1999) <http://www.mbc.com/legis/cecc-fin.html>.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 745 (stating that safekeeping the private
key is a preventive measure that the subscriber must undertake).
112. The standard to become a notary varies throughout the jurisdictions. A notary
public is defined as:
A public officer whose function is to administer oaths; to attest and certify; by his
[or her] hand and official seal, certain classes of documents in order to give them
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the sense that it is an official verification authority, just like a notary
who signs and affixes a seal1 13 on a document to signify the identity of a
document signer and the validity of the signature. 1 14 However, one significant difference between the two verification authorities is that a notary in most jurisdictions must be at least eighteen years old and must
proclaim no record of felonies. 1 15 Additionally, notaries in some thirty
credit and authenticity in foreign jurisdictions; to take acknowledgments of deeds
other conveyances, and certify the same; and to perform certain official acts,
chiefly in commercial matters, such as the protesting of notes, bills, [and] the noting of foreign drafts ....
BLAciKs LAw DICTIONARY 1060 (6th ed. 1990). In general, an applicant must be about
eighteen years old. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 721. The applicant must also
be a resident of the state in which they act. Id. Notary applicants may also need to proclaim on their application whether they have any criminal record of felonies; however, most
states do not verify the criminal records of these applicants. Id. Notaries in some thirty
states are also required to obtain a surety bond to "'assure the faithful performance of
duties, and to compensate any person who may suffer a loss because of the notary's misconduct.'" Id. The notary applicant pays a minimal fee and, after taking an oath of office, the
applicant becomes an official notary for a term of about four years. Id. at 722. A number of
states require that the notary applicant be literate in English or some other language. Id.
A few states also require notary applicants to submit to a written examination. Id.
A notary is vested with the full authority by the state's notary law. Id. The statutory
authority of notaries will vary from state to state. Id. at 723. However, all notaries possess
at least two types of authority: "(1) they can administer oaths (such as given to witnesses,
and to public officials when they are sworn into office), and (2) notaries can attest to the
authenticity of signatures on documents." Id. Notaries also, in some states, can perform
weddings, can protest against commercial paper, can open and inventory bank deposit
boxes, and they also can verify copies of certain documents. Id.
113. The seal has it origins from ancient Rome. Kumpe v. Gee, 187 S.W. 2d 932, 934
(Tex. Ct. App. 1945); Raymond C. Rothman, NOTARY PUBLIC PRACTICES AND GLOSSARY 1
(1978). Parties in contracts were often not able to write. Id. at 1. The parties, therefore,
"would use metal or a clay disk, called a private seal,' which was engraved with a special
design or family coat of arms as their signature to the agreement." Id. A sticky substance
was then "melted onto the paper at the end of the document, upon which the private seal
was impressed." Id. "In the centuries to follow, people learned to write, and the art of
making paper became more merchandised, thus increasing supply." Id. Eventually contracts were taking up more than one page; thus, two holes were made in the margin of the
papers and tied together with ribbon. Id. at 2. The notary would melt wax over the ribbon's knot and impress it with a seal. Id. This process is how today's definition of the word
"seal," meaning to "make secure," came into being. Id. For information regarding promises
under seal, see generally Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise Under Seal as
a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 617 (1993).
114. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 742; Emilo Jaksetic, Notaries Who Undermine Our Property System, 22 ILL. L. REV. 748, 749 (1928). Computer-based transactions
have now given rise to an entity whose responsibility is to ensure the integrity of the transaction. Id. at 21. The entity is known as the certification authority. See generally Benjamin Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributing the Risks of Electronic Signatures, 15 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 189 (1997). "Just as risks plague the authentication of
paper documents, so too will they plague the authentication of electronic documents." Id.
at 191.
115. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 720.
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states are required to obtain a surety bond to assure the faithful performance of duties, and to compensate any person who may suffer a loss
because of the notary's misconduct. 1 16 Unfortunately, the Act does not
require a minimum age limit, no background check exists, and no minimum insurance is necessary. In fact, there are absolutely no requirements to become a certification authority. 117 The certification authority
could be an eleven-year-old or a convict who has just been released from
prison for committing computer fraud. The standard to become a certification authority is not sufficient.
In response to certification authority requirements, the Act declares
that for public policy reasons the regulation of certification authorities is
not appropriate.1 1 8 The Commission believes that it will "inhibit rather
116. See id. at 721.
117. At least Utah has created some basic requirements for persons who want to obtain
a license as a certification authority:
(1) To obtain or retain a license a certification authority shall:
(a) be the subscriber of a certificate published in a recognized repository;
(b) employ as operative personnel only persons who have not been convicted of
a felony or a crime involving fraud, false statement, or deception;
(c) employ as operative personnel only persons who have demonstrated knowledge and proficiency in following the requirements of this chapter;
(d) file with the division a suitable guaranty, unless the certification authority
is the governor, a department or division of state government, the attorney
general, state auditor, state treasurer, the judicial council, a city, a county, or
the Legislature or its staff offices provided that:
(i) each of the above named governmental entities may act through designated officials authorized by ordinance, rule, or statute to perform certification authority functions; and
(ii) one of the above named governmental entities is the subscriber of all
certificates issued by the certification authority;
(e) have the right to use a trustworthy system, including a secure means for
controlling usage of its private key;
(f) present proof to the division of having working capital reasonably sufficient, according to the rules of the division, to enable the applicant to conduct
business as a certification authority;
(g) maintain an office in Utah or have established a registered agent for service of process in Utah; and
(h) comply with all other licensing requirements established by division rule.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201.

118. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 15-115 cmt. 2. The Act states that
at some point in time it may be appropriate to regulate when "the marketplace has matured, appropriate business models have been established, and specific abuses and
problems have been identified." Id. at cmt. 2(a). There are four reasons for regulating the
issuance of certificates and the conduct of the certification authorities:
(1) to ensure quality control of certification authorities in order to protect the citizens of the state from fraudulent or inappropriate conduct by certification authorities, and the damage that may flow from improperly issued certificates (i.e., public
policy reasons);
(2) to provide a source of revenue, such as that which might be generated by a
collection of license fees;

934

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVII

than enable the development of electronic commerce. " 1 19 However, with(3) to ensure the quality control of certificates issued by certification authorities
for the purpose of determining when a digital signature qualifies as a signature
under the laws of the state; and
(4) to measure the trustworthiness of a certificate for purposes of determining
when it is sufficiently trustworthy such that a digital signature verified with reference to such a certificate will be accorded heightened evidentiary presumptions
(e.g., status as a secure electronic signature).
Id. at cmt. 2. However, the Act negates the first three. The Act, in negating the first suggested factor, states that regulation of certification authorities for public policy reasons "is
deemed not to be appropriate at this time for a variety of reasons." Id. at cmt. 2 (a). One
reason is that because the use of digital signatures is so new, there is concern that if the
state tried to regulate the conduct of certification authorities that it will "simply interfere
with the development of the marketplace and appropriate business models, and thus inhibit rather than enable the development of electronic commerce." Id. The Act further
states that regulation is "deemed inappropriate because it appears to be unworkable at a
state-by-state or country-by-country level as applied to a system of global commerce." Id.
The Act, in addressing the second suggested factor, states that regulation of certification authorities "for purposes of raising additional revenues is also deemed to be inappropriate because of the potentially inhibiting effects that it may have on the implementation
of electronic commerce." Id. at cmt. 2(b). The purpose of the act is to "enable and promote
electronic commerce, not inhibit or restrict it, such that taxation is deemed inappropriate."
Id. The Act further states that in the current marketplace it would not be a profitable idea.
However, the Act does allow the Secretary of State to charge a fee in relation to the "certification or accreditation of certification authorities if appropriate to recover costs." Id.
The Act, in addressing the third suggested factor, states that there is no need to regulate "certification authorities in order to determine when a digital signature qualifies as a
signature." Id. at cmt. 2(c). The Act states that pursuant to section 5-120, that "any electronic signature qualifies as a signature, regardless of the level of security inherent within
it. Thus, an electronic 'x,' a digitized handwritten signature, a digital signature of low
trustworthiness, and a highly reliable digital signature, all qualify as a signature for purposes of statutory writing and signature requirements." Id. There is not "minimum
threshold" that an electronic mark must meet. Id. All that matters is that the mark can be
shown that it was made by the purported signer with the "requisite intent." Id. "Proving
such facts may be difficult for the recipient of many forms of electronic signatures, and the
ability to prove such facts may effect the willingness of a recipient to rely on messages
signed with certain forms of electronic signatures." Id. However, if the recipient is able to
prove that the symbol was made by a specific person "with the requisite intent, the signature is considered valid, just as it would be if the same 'x' were typed onto a paper document by the same person with the same intent." Id. This position "recognizes that there
may be many uses for certificates that do not carry a high level of reliability, and that it is
the intent not to inhibit or restrict the use of such certificates at this time." Id.
The Act, in addressing the fourth suggested factor, states that this is the only "regulation of certification authorities deemed appropriate for the state at this time. Id. at cmt.
2(c). This approach is similar to the approach taken by the state in addressing handwritten signatures. Id. For example, "the creation of handwritten signatures is not regulated
except in situations where the state grants heightened evidentiary presumption to a handwritten signature." Id. An example of this occurs with respect to the notarization of signatures, "which makes a document self-authenticating under applicable rules of evidence,
obtaining the benefit of such a presumption requires the use of a notary licensed by the
state." Id.
119. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act § 15-115 cmt. 2(a).
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out immediate basic regulation, the advancement of electronic commerce
will not progress, but instead regress through the errors and misconduct
of an unregulated verification authority, and thus, the goals of the Act
will be defeated. 120 Therefore, until certification authority requirements
are implemented under the Act, one must not use digital signatures as a
mode of communication.
120. Section 15-115(a) of the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act states that the
Secretary of State may:
(a) [A]dopt rules applicable to both the public and private sectors for the purpose of
defining when a certificate is considered trustworthy under Section 15-105 such
that a digital signature verified by reference to such a certificate will be considered
a qualified security procedure under Section 10-110. The rules may include (1)
establishing or adopting standards applicable to certification authorities or certificates, compliance with which may be measured by becoming certified by the Secretary of State, becoming accredited by one or more independent accrediting entities
recognized by the Secretary of State, or by other means, and (2) where appropriate, establishing fees to be charged by the Secretary of State to recover all or a
portion of its costs in connection therewith.
(b) In developing the rules, the Secretary of State shall endeavor to do so in a
manner that will provide maximum flexibility to the implementation of digital signature technology and the business models necessary to support it, that will provide a clear basis for the recognition of certificates issued by foreign certification
authorities, and, to the extent reasonably possible, that will maximize the opportunities for uniformity with the laws of other jurisdictions (both within the United
States and internationally).
(c) The Secretary of State shall have exclusive authority to adopt rules authorized
by this section.
Id. Illinois has many statutes that "grant privileges or authority to persons or entities
accredited by third party private accreditation agencies." Id. at cmt. 4(c). For example:
(a) Adult developmental training day services which must meet minimum standards specified by the Department of Human Services or alternatively, may be
accredited under nationally recognized accreditation programs, in which case they
will be deemed to have met the standards established by the department. Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Administrative Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
1705/15.2.
(b) A substitute teacher's certificate may be issued to persons who meet certain
requirements, or alternatively, who hold a Bachelor of Arts degree from an institution of higher learning accredited by the North Central Association or other comparable regional accrediting association. Certification of Teachers, 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/21-9.
(c) Licenses to practice clinical psychology are issued to person [s] who have graduated from schools accredited by the American Psychological Association or similar
regional accrediting body. Clinical Psychologist Licensing Act, 225 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 15110.
Id. In subsection (b), two points are recognized:
First, that it is important not to adopt regulations that might unduly restrict the
development and implementation of digital signature technology to facilitate electronic commerce. Second, that to the extent possible, it is important to promote
uniformity of law and interoperability of regulatory provisions on a national and
international level in order to facilitate and promote international electronic
commerce.
Id. at cmt. 5.
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POTENTIAL DIGITAL SIGNATURE PARTICIPANTS MUST CONTINUE To
USE THE NOTARIZATION PROCESS, BECAUSE THE ACT CREATES

Too GREAT OF A POTENTIAL LIABILITY
1.

The Advantages of the NotarizationProcess

An advantage of using the notarization process is the liability coverage that a notary maintains. 12 1 A certification authority under the Act,
however, is not required to maintain any liability coverage. This omission alone immediately warns a potential participant of the digital signature process that there is the potential to incur great loss. Why
speculate in a business transaction in which the most important part,
being the verification of the digital signature, is done by a person who
has no liability insurance? At least in the notarization process, there is
some type of basic coverage. 1 22 Without insurance, participants will be
121. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 725. "The standard of liability for the
notary public is almost uniformly one of objective reasonable prudence, meaning that
under the law a notary must act as a reasonable notary would act under similar circumstances." Id. A notary public will nearly always be liable for "negligent, reckless, or willful
conduct." Id. The notary may be liable for all proximately caused injuries. Id. The liability may also extend to the notary's employer under "common law vicarious liability principles or under the employer responsibility provisions of state notary statutes." Id. at 726.
However, "notaries are not held liable for acknowledging a forged signature on a document
where they have acted in good faith, and with reasonable efforts to discover the identity of
the individual whose signature is being notarized." Id. at 727. Nevertheless, if a notary
does engage in negligent conduct, he or she may be held liable and, if the notary commits a
willful violation, "such as executing a knowingly false attestation, s/he may be liable for all
proximately caused injuries, possibly including punitive damages." Id. Furthermore, "any
conduct rising to the level of criminal activity may result in criminal prosecution, for official
misconduct or for violation of the state notary statute's criminal provisions." Id. A notary's
negligence is not tolerated in courts of law, as evidenced by the court in Summers Bros. Inc.
v. Brewer, 420 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1982), where it held that:
Even if [the notary) did not know that the signature on the contract were forgeries,
he knew that by authenticating the document, as a notary, he was telling the
world that the parties had appeared before him and affixed their signatures in his
presence. Thus, he committed fraud in that he purposely let third parties rely on a
document purporting to be genuine but actually without validity as an authentic
act. The "proof of validity he supplied was misleading to all who relied on the
contract.
Id. at 204. See also Immerman v. Ostertag, 199 A.2d 869, 874 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1964) (concluding that a notary displayed a "high degree of negligence" in certifying an
acknowledgment without determining whether the individuals purporting to have made
the statements even knew of the nature or the contents of what they were signing); Galloway v. Cinello, 423 S.E.2d 875, 881 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that a notary's negligent act
proximately caused the defendant to lose her status as a secured creditor); City Consumer
Serv. Inc. v. Metcalf, 775 P.2d 1065 (Ariz. 1989) (finding that the notary negligently notarized a woman's deed based solely upon representation).
122. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 709. However, one must note that bonds
"do not actually protect notaries because, if the bond company has to pay a claim resulting
from a particular notary's mistake or misconduct, the bond company will seek reimbursement from that notary." Id.
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at the mercy of the certification authority and, thus, all that participants
can do is hope that the certification authority does not negligently or intentionally make a mistake. Therefore, until the Act creates some type
of minimal liability coverage for certification authorities, potential participants must use digital signatures at their own risk.
2.

The Advantages of Signing Paper Documents

The notarization process is more trustworthy than the digital signature process because the verification authority in the notarization process has more reliable documentation standards. For example, the
typical legal battle that will emerge in digital signature cases, as regulated by the Act, will involve the unauthorized use of a subscriber's private key and the damage that it caused to the relying party. However,
this battle could have been prevented if the parties would have used a
notary.
When having a document notarized, the notary can refuse to nota12 3
rize the document if the notary has knowledge or reasonable suspicion
that the transaction that is about to happen is unlawful. The notary can
also insist that the signer, and any witness who will be identifying the
signer, be present before the notary at the time of notarization. 1 24 Addi123.

NAT'L NOTARY ASS'N., THE NOTARY PuB. CODE OF PROF. RESP., § I-A-2 (1998) (un-

published final draft). The following is a situation where the Notary should refuse to notarize a stranger's document, because there is evidence that the stranger's I.D. has been
tampered with, thus, notifying the notary that the stranger is an impostor. Id.
The Notary is asked by a stranger to notarize that person's signature on a document. As proof of identity, the stranger presents a single identification card, a
state driver's license. The Notary notices that the photograph on the license is
raised from the surface of the card and appears to overlay a state seal and the
signature of a DMV official.
Id. The purpose of the Code of Professional Responsibility [hereinafter Code] is to "guide
Notaries Public in the United States when statutes, regulations and official directives fall
short." Id. at 2. The Code has two types of standards. "The majority are principals, policies and practices that have proven over the years to be effective in helping notaries perform their primary function of detecting and deterring fraud; in minimizing fraud, these
standards also work to reduce the Notary's exposure to lawsuits." Id. The Code's second
standard "derive[s] from the conviction that a public officer in a democracy must serve all
persons equally, without regard to such distinctions as race, nationality, ethnicity, citizenship, religion, politics, lifestyle, age, disability, gender, or sexual orientation." Id.
Furthermore, because the acts of notaries effect "individual rights and property under
both civil and criminal law, it is imperative that professional standards for Notaries be
widely acknowledged as just, fair and well developed." Id. Therefore, the standards of the
Code were created from "input of representatives of occupational fields with a large constituency of Notaries Public." Id.
124. Id. § III-A-I. For example, a notary "is telephoned by a client who has just signed
and mailed several documents for the Notary to notarize without personal appearance." Id.
The notary should decline to perform a "telephone notarization" without "the physical presence of the signer, since it would be a clear violation of the law, even though the Notary
feels relatively certain about the identity, volition and awareness of the signer." Id.
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tionally, the notary identifies each signer through personal knowledge,
at least one reliable identification document bearing a photograph, or the
sworn word of a credible witness. 12 5 Furthermore, the notary cannot notarize if the notary believes that the signer is not aware of the significance of the transaction.1 26 The notary can also administer an oath to
compel truthfulness in a witness who is identifying a signer 12 7 and can
require that two individuals in addition to the notary witness 128 the affixation of the signer's mark.
In comparison, the signing of an electronic document using the digital signature process, as regulated by the Act, is less concerned with the
identity of the subscriber, and instead focuses on the authenticity of the
125. Id. § III-B-1. For example:
The Notary is approached by a friend and a stranger identified by the friend as a
business associate. The friend requests notarization of the associate's signature
on a document, but is not involved in the transaction. When the Notary asks the
associate for identification, the friend becomes indignant because the Notary won't
take his word as bond.
Id. The notary should continue to insist that the "associate produce a reliable form of identification bearing a photograph or that the friend be formally sworn in as a credible witness
vouching for the associate's identity." Id.
126. Id. § Ill-C-1. For example:
The Notary is called to the home of an elderly person to notarize that individual's
signature on several documents. The Notary is introduced to that would be signer
by the person's relative. Acting in a childlike manner, the elderly person appears
disinterested in the documents. Though the relative urges the Notary to act, the
Notary is unable to get a coherent response to the question, "Why do you want to
sign these documents?"
Id. The notary should not notarize the documents, because the person's conduct indicates a
strong likelihood that the "individual is not at the moment capable of a responsible action."
Id.
127. Id. § ll-D-2. For example, a notary is telephoned by a client who tells the notary
that he will stop by later that day to sign a deed that needs to be notarized. Id. "The client
mentions that the deed requires one witness in addition to the Notary, and asks if a friend
may witness the signature on the document before it is brought in." Id. The notary explains that:
[T]he client may sign the deed and have the signature witnessed outside of the
Notary's presence prior to appearing before the Notary to acknowledge the signature. The Notary also explains that it will not be necessary for the witness to appear and take an oath, since the Notary will positively identify the client based on
personal knowledge of identity and not rely on the witness to make the
identification.
Id.
128. Id. § l1l-D-7. For example, the notary is called to the bedside of patient at a hospital to notarize a "person's signature on a power of attorney naming a spouse as attorney in
fact." Id. The patient who is ill and weak is only able to affix an "x" on the document rather
than the normal signature. Id. "The spouse offers to sign as a witness to the mark." Id.
"The notary explains that two persons in addition to the Notary must witness the making
of the mark." Id. Therefore, "[tihe Notary disqualifies the spouse as a witness, since the
individual is both in and affected by the document. Instead, the spouse finds two neighbors,
both of whom present reliable ID cards, to witness the patient's mark." Id.
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subscriber's signature device. To have an electronic document signed using the digital signature process, the subscriber will encode his or her
signature on the computer using the private key, which acts as the signature device. 129 By doing so, the digital signature will go to a repository
that has stored the coded signature. 130 The certification authority then
checks the repository to see if the private key matches the public key of
the relying party which is also on file in the repository. 13 1 If there is a
match, the certification authority digitally signs the document and issues a computer-based certificate of authenticity. 1 3 2 This approval of
sorts by the certification authority is similar to a notary who signs and
seals a document to signify the validity of the transaction. However, a
certification authority cannot determine whether the subscriber is authorized or whether the subscriber is an impostor. The certification authority can only determine whether the subscriber has the correct
signature device. Therefore, the identity of the subscriber remains anonymous, unlike the signer in a notarization, thereby increasing the
chances of fraud and liability.
To cure this defect, the Act must either amend the standard of care
to absolute liability or instill biometric technology 13 3 to accompany digital signatures, or notarization will always be superior to digital signatures in regard to the identification of the signer. Therefore, a
participant must not use a digital signature, as regulated by the Act,
until the Act adopts better ways to truly know the identity of the signer.
E.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT

The Act is a great step forward for Illinois and the Nation. The implementation of digital signatures as a security procedure for electronic
commerce is an efficient creation destined to be used worldwide. However, the Act must be properly amended and, until such a time occurs, a
participant must use it at his or her own risk.
1.

Absolute Liability for the Subscriber

The Act requires that a subscriber exercise reasonable care to prevent the unauthorized use of his or her private key. This standard is too
low. The subscriber must be held to the standard of absolute liability for
the unauthorized use of his or her private key. In doing so, the participants in the digital signature process will greatly increase their confi129. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 737.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See id. (stating that authenticating an electronic document is a process that must
be regulated for a successful digital signature program).
133. See infra note 143.
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dence because of the integrity of the process.' 3 4 Furthermore, with
absolute liability, the subscriber is forced to closely guard the private
key. Thus, the subscriber reduces his or her overall liability stemming
from unauthorized use and unauthorized access, which will happen more
often when a reasonable standard of care is used.
2.

CertificationAuthority Requirements

A certification authority plays the most important role in the digital
signature process. The certification authority is the gatekeeper of authentication. However, the Act has no requirements to become a certification authority. The Act must delineate to a commissioning officer the
ability to accept or reject certification authority applicants based on requirements regarding experience, age, and education. Furthermore, the
agency in charge of issuing the revocable license to a certification authority should also do a background check for criminal records and other violations, especially focusing on those who have committed fraud.
The suggested type of screening parallels the screening as listed in
The Model Notary Act. 135 The Model Notary Act requires an applicant
to be at least eighteen years old, possess the ability to read and write in
English, and to have passed the notary written examination. 13 6 Furthermore, the notary-commissioning officer, as regulated by The Model
Notary Act, can deny an applicant if the applicant has been convicted of
13 7
a crime involving dishonesty or moral turpitude.
The Act does not establish any financial responsibility levels for a
certification authority. Moreover, the Act does not require the certification authority to carry any liability insurance. This is not acceptable.
This Act has not considered the human factor. A human will commit
error. A human will lie, cheat, and steal. The other parties must be held
responsible for such negligent and intentional misconduct. These human
errors create insecurity in the process, therefore, a certification authority
must be required to carry minimum insurance for specific levels of
transactions.
F.

SUGGESTED SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR THE SUBSCRIBER

A subscriber can use a number of security techniques to protect the
private key. One example of a good defense is the use of a security sys134. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 754. If absolute liability did exist, insurance companies would most likely insure "private key holders against theft or loss of their
private key, thus providing more assurance to both private key holders as well as their
intended recipients." Id.
135. See THE NAT'L NoTARY ASS'N, supra note 71, § 2-101 (9-13).
136. See id.
137. See id. § 2-101 (16-18).

1999]

ILLINOIS ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SECURITY ACT

941

tern in the start up program of the computer. Such a system would not
allow a user to proceed beyond the security screen, unless the correct
password is entered. Another defensive tactic is to isolate the computer
in a room specifically reserved for such transactions. The door to the
room could have numerous types of security features itself and only
those who have access would be allowed to enter the secured room.
Therefore, the key to a good defense is to take security measures not only
to protect access to the computer upon which the transaction will take
place, but also to deny access to the room that the computer will be
placed.
In the future, when digital signatures are commonplace, the first
line of defense will not be enough. The more that is known about the
technology, the easier it is to master. Thus, passwords that will try to
keep away persons that do not belong will become manageable for an
unauthorized user. Therefore, more stringent tactics are needed to prevent such intrusions. One such tactic is the use of a cryptographic token
or smart card.1 38 This method stores the private key in the token or card
and, thus, the private key is never divulged outside of the token or
card. 139 In doing so, the private key does not pass into the main memory
of the subscriber's computer,1 4 0 which can prevent unauthorized users
from retrieving the private key upon gaining access to the computer's
memory. Another added benefit to such a security system is that the
token or card will not fully activate in the computer unless a password or
personal identification number is entered, thus, making access even
harder.1 41 Another example of technology that can make keeping the
private key a less foreboding task is the use of biometric authentication 14 2 such as a retinal scan or fingerprint scan. 143 These types of high138. See Digital Signature Guidelines,supra note 2, at 8 n.20. Numerous methods are
available for securing a private key. Id. "The safer methods store the private key in a
'cryptographic token' (one example is a 'smart card' ) which executes the signature program
within an internal microprocessing chip, so that the private key is never divulged outside
the token. Id. Furthermore, by using a "cryptographic token" the private key does "not
pass into the main memory or processor of the signer's computer." Id. Moreover:
The signer must typically present to the token some authenticating information,
such as a password, pass phrase, or personal identification number, for the token
to run a process requiring access to the private key. In addition, this token must be
physically produced, and biometric authentication such as finger prints or retinal
scan can assure the physical presence of the token's authorization holder. There
are also software-based schemes for protecting the security of the private key, generally less secure than hardware schemes, but providing adequate security for
many types of applications.

Id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. (providing such a device for the implementation of the subscriber's private
key is a good preventive measure for protecting against unauthorized access).
142. See id.
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tech security systems will assure the physical presence of the subscriber
and/or designated agents of the subscriber, 144 and perhaps are the best
means of denying unauthorized user access.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and institutions. But
laws and institutions must go hand-in-hand with progress of the human
mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opinions
change, with change of circumstances, institutions must advance also to
keep pace with the times.
Thomas Jefferson (1816)145
The ability of persons to use digital signatures with confidence as a
documentation device creates new and exciting applications. However, if
the act hinders the use rather than advances it, the act has sufficiently
defeated the technology. This is the case with the Act. The Act has
made the use of digital signature technology impractical due to the increased risk of liability for the participants who use the procedure.
Therefore, potential digital signature users must continue to use the notarization process, until the Act can be properly amended to cure its
deficiencies.
To cure the deficiencies, the authors of the Act must examine the
Model Notary Act, 14 6 other digital signature acts, 14 7 and commentaries
on the Act, 14 8 in order to get an overall assessment regarding potential
improvements. Suggested improvements consist of making the sub143. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 8 n.20. Some notary legislation
requires the signer's thumbprint before notarization. Therefore, an exact identifying mark
is recorded. For example, California requires notaries to take signer's thumbprints before
notarizing real estate deeds. See Closen & Richards, supra note 5, at 733 n.183. Using
thumbprint identification accomplishes many goals. First, thumb printings will "deter impostors from scamming notaries into notarizing forged deeds because it is unlikely that the
forger would want to leave a thumbprint." Id. Second, thumb printing can deter "signers
from falsely attesting to a conartist's forged signature for fear of individual culpability." Id.
Third, thumb printing "puts all signers, especially the vulnerable, like the elderly, on notice of the serious legal consequences of what they are about to sign." Id. It seems that
digital signature legislation should take some lessons from notary legislation with regard
to protecting the participants.
144. See Digital Signature Guidelines, supra note 2, at 8 n.20.
145. John C. Yates, Recent Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data
Interchange, 430 PRAc. L. INST. 271, 277 (1996).
146. See THE NAT'L NoTARY ASS'N, supra note 71.
147. See The Basics of Digital Signatures, 2 (visited September 4, 1998) <httpJ/
www.uiw.com>. There are over thirty-five states that have passed digital signature
legislation.
148. This Comment along with other law journal articles can provide a good source of
non-bias information.
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scriber absolutely liable for the standard of care given to its private key,
creating certification authority requirements, 149 and requiring a certification authority to possess minimum liability insurance for specific
transactions. Therefore, only upon making such amendments, can the
Act regain its true intent of protecting and promoting "the interests of
Illinois businesses and citizens engaged in online business, commercial,
and personal activities."15 0
Stephen G. Myers

149. See Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, H.B. 3180, § 10-135 (effective July
1, 1999) <http://www.mbc.com/legis/eecc-fin.html>. The Act gives the Secretary of State
the power to adopt rules for the certification or decertification of security procedures, and
for adopting standards for the use of electronic signatures by the State. Id. The Secretary
of State can also authorize standards for both the public and private certification authorities through State certification or accreditation by an independent accrediting agency. Id.
§ 15-115.

150.

COMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND CRIME,

supra note 6, at 4.
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